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Abstract
This study analyses the process of economic integration in Latin America. Making use 
of a structural gravity model, this paper provides an ex-post assessment of the effect of 
the trade agreements (TAs) signed by Latin American countries on international trade. 
We account for the last wave of TAs proliferation and estimate treaty level effects. 
On average, TAs had a positive effect on Latin American trade. This holds true for both 
intra-Latin American agreements and agreements between Latin American countries 
and the rest of the world. However, we unveil that these average estimates cover 
a substantial degree of heterogeneity across TAs. Additionally, we quantify ex-ante 
general equilibrium effects on the trade volumes and welfare of Latin American 
countries under different scenarios of deeper integration.
Keywords: international trade, trade agreements, Latin America, welfare effects.
JEL classifi cation: F13, F14, F15, O54.
Resumen
Este documento analiza el proceso de integración económica en América Latina. 
Utilizando un modelo de gravedad estructural, proporciona una evaluación ex post 
del efecto de los acuerdos comerciales fi rmados por los países latinoamericanos 
en el comercio internacional. Tenemos en cuenta la última ola de proliferación de
acuerdos comerciales y estimamos los efectos de cada uno. De promedio, 
los acuerdos comerciales tuvieron un efecto positivo en el comercio latinoamericano. 
Esto es válido tanto para los acuerdos intralatinoamericanos como para los acuerdos 
entre países latinoamericanos y el resto del mundo. Sin embargo, descubrimos que 
estas estimaciones promedio cubren un importante nivel de heterogeneidad entre 
los acuerdos comerciales. Además, cuantifi camos los efectos de equilibrio general 
ex ante sobre los volúmenes de comercio y el bienestar de los países latinoamericanos 
en diferentes escenarios de integración más profunda.
Palabras clave: comercio internacional, acuerdos comerciales, América Latina, efectos 
de bienestar.
Códigos JEL: F13, F14, F15, O54.
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1 See Table 4 for more information on the agreements (name). 
Figure 1: Trade agreements involving at least one Latin American country 
 
Note: TA LA-RoW identifies trade agreements where at least one Latin American country and one non-Latin 
American (i.e. “rest of the world”) country are members. TA LA-LA identifies trade agreements where all 
members are Latin American countries. Columns represent the number of trade agreements signed in the 
corresponding year. Lines represent the cumulative number of trade agreements in force. Only trade 
agreements in force are counted. The year represents the year of entry into force. * Data include information 
up to February 2020. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on WTO data. 
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1. Introduction 
A deeper integration among Latin American countries and between the region and the 
rest of the world has long been argued as one of the possible catalyst for promoting 
economic development in the area. Policy-makers have not turned a deaf ear to these 
appeals and have been very active, since the creation of the Central American Economic 
Integration Agreement (CAEIA) in 1961, the first trade agreement (TA) in the region and 
one of the first in the world since WWII (Baier et al., 2007). Since the 2000s, with WTO-
wide trade talks deadlocked in the Doha round, the number of TAs signed by Latin 
American countries skyrocketed (see Figure 1).1 The increasing relevance of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements in the international trade architecture goes hand in hand with 
the growing necessity of understanding to what extent these treaties achieved their agreed 
objectives, i.e. to promote trade among their partners. 
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Making use of a structural gravity model, this paper provides an ex-post assessment of 
the effect of the TAs signed by Latin American countries on international trade, as well 
as ex-ante predictions of the effects of deeper trade integration for Latin American 
countries on trade and welfare. Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, even 
if economic integration of Latin America has been widely studied (i.a. Camarero et al., 
2016; Porto, 2007; Baier et al., 2007; Dixon and Haslam, 2006; Schiff, 2002; Rutheford 
and Martinez, 2000; Panagariya, 1996), to the best of our knowledge, there is practically 
no study that systematically focuses on the effects of TAs on trade including the last 
twenty years; second, we estimate treaty level effects in detail, unveiling a great degree 
of heterogeneity across TAs and country-pairs within the same agreement; and third, we 
quantify general equilibrium effects on the trade volumes and welfare of Latin American 
countries under alternative scenarios of deeper integration. To properly deal with trade 
data heteroscedasticity and “zeros”, we perform these estimations using a poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). We also account for “intra-
national” trade flows, as the increase in bilateral trade between TA members may derive 
from the choice of selling internationally rather than domestically. 
We find that, overall, trade agreements have a positive and significant average effect on 
bilateral trade among members. However, when estimating the effects at the single 
agreement level, we discover a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the results. Indeed, 
38 (64%) of the 59 estimations performed at the TA level have trade-enhancing effects, 
whereas 19 (32%) of them have no significant effect on trade. The remaining 2 (3%) have 
negative effect on trade. Our general equilibrium estimates show that deeper integration 
would suppose, overall, a substantial increase in trade and welfare for Latin American 
countries, but with a non-negligible degree of heterogeneity at the country level.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review, 
Section 3 the methodology and the data used for our partial equilibrium estimations, and 
Section 4 discusses the results obtained. Section 5 capitalizes on the literature and the rest 
of the paper to construct alternative scenarios of deeper integration and calculate general 
equilibrium trade and welfare effects. Section 6 draws the conclusions. 
2. Literature review  
What are the consequences of TAs on trade? The international trade literature has been 
dealing with this question since its very early days, predominantly by the means of 
exploiting the predictive power of gravity equations. Indeed, since what it is often referred 
to as the first gravity application in contemporary times (Tinbergen, 1962), gravity 
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2 In this work, Anderson established the theoretical foundations of the “economic gravity”. 
equations relate trade flows between two countries to their economic mass and distance 
(see Lampe and Sharp, 2019, for more details on the history of gravity). These models 
also consider the role of trade policy, usually by including information on the existence 
of a TA between the two parties or a TA that includes the two parties among the members. 
From a methodological perspective, there have been a variety of developments on how 
gravity models are conceived and implemented, both from a theoretical and an empirical 
standpoint. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Piermartini and Yotov (2016) provide wide-
ranging summaries. Here, we restrict ourselves to three main issues that have been widely 
discussed in the literature and are functional to understand the motivation of our approach. 
The first issue relates to a potential problem of omitted variable bias: the importance of 
including the so-called “multilateral trade resistances” (MTRs) through the use of 
exporter-time and importer-time fixed effects, an idea elaborated by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) exploiting the previous work of Anderson (1979).2 As summarized by 
Lampe and Sharp (2019), these country-specific time-varying characteristics relates “to 
the idea of a ‘home bias’ that make them more or less reluctant to trade internationally”. 
The second issue deals with the problem of endogeneity: countries that trade more among 
them may be more likely to sign a trade agreement. The gold standard in the gravity 
literature is the solution proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007): using panel data 
(instead of cross-sections) with country-pair fixed effects. However, recently, Larch et al. 
(2018) and Piermartini and Yotov (2016) proposed alternative ways to test for strict 
exogeneity: a) including pair time trends, to capture monotonic trends in the evolution of 
bilateral trade, and b) including leads of the trade agreement(s) dummy. In this case, in 
absence of reverse causality (in other words, if the trade agreement variable is strictly 
exogenous), the lead should be not statistically different from zero. We will consider these 
two approaches in the robustness analysis. The third issue involves the change in relative 
costs that occurred after the entry into force of a TA. A TA changes not only the relative 
costs of trading with a signatory partner versus a non-signatory partner, but also those of 
trading with a signatory partner instead of selling the product in the home market. Heid 
et al. (2017) propose a straightforward solution, which is to include intra-national trade, 
i.e. domestic sales (for a brief discussion see Sellner, 2019). These three adjustments 
allow us to provide unbiased estimations. Additionally, and perhaps more interestingly, 
we are able to estimate treaty level effects, unveiling a great degree of heterogeneity 
across TAs. We remark that, to the best of our knowledge there is no study providing such 
estimates. However, the literature provides a number of scholar efforts that 1) estimate 
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3 Their estimates refer to the six main regional trade agreements in the region, such as the Andean Community (CAN), 
the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
4 While in the following part of this section we report a brief summary for those TAs that received more attention, 
Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) and Head and Mayer (2014) provide a wider summary of the gravity literature with 
meta-analysis techniques. 
5 Foster and Stehrer (2011) find a negative (or non-significant) effect of the NAFTA on trade. However, they seem to 
incur in what Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) defined as “silver medal mistake” of gravity equations (generally, gravity 
equations focus on uni-directional bilateral trade; however, if researchers decide to use two-way exports gravity theory 
prescribes to use the sum – or the average – of the logarithm of uni-directional trade flows rather than the logarithm of 
the sum), and to exclude zero trade flows (possible self-selection bias). On an earlier exercise Baier et al. (2007) find 
that the NAFTA had no effect on trade, however they justify the result as follows: “Since NAFTA was phased in over 
a 10-year period starting in 1994, the coefficient estimate for NAFTA will only pick up six years of the agreement, and 
only partial liberalization” (p.1371). 
that fostered intra-bloc trade (Carrillo-Tudela and Li, 2004; Yamarik and Ghosh, 2005; 
Lee and Park, 2005; Trotignon, 2009). As acknowledged by Coulibaly (2009), Mercosur 
effects are more debated. For example, Baier et al. (2019), Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-
Lehmann (2003), Recalde and Florensa (2008), and Cuenca Garcia et al. (2013) find 
the average effect of TAs on trade in Latin America; 2) implement case studies for certain 
regional agreements, 3) present separately the individual TA effect for a set of 
agreements. Those are obvious candidates for setting the context and serving as 
comparisons. 
The literature concludes that, on average, TAs have been largely beneficial for Latin 
American countries (IADB, 2018; Hannan, 2017; Florensa et al., 2015; Márquez-Ramos 
et al., 2015; Soloaga and Wintersb, 2001). However, the aggregate result hides a 
substantial degree of heterogeneity at the geographical and agreement level. On one side, 
geographically, IADB (2018) finds that agreements among Latin American countries3 
have sizeable effects on bilateral trade among members. Those effects are found to be 
larger than those of the agreements implemented between Latin American countries and 
the “rest of the world” (RoW). On the other side, at the agreement level, there are a variety 
of studies, sometimes with contrasting results.4 These case studies focused mainly on the 
Americas’ biggest RTAs: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the Andean Community (CAN), the Central 
American Common Market (CACM) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). For 
example, most of the literature agrees that NAFTA had positive effect on trade (Carrère, 
2006; Romalis, 2007; Fratianni and Oh, 2009; Geldi, 2012; Caliendo and Parro, 2015) for 
its members.5 The Andean Community has also largely been regarded as an agreement 
positive effects on intra-block trade, whereas Carrillo-Tudela and Li (2004) and Geldi 
(2012) argue that the Mercosur integration did not deliver results in terms of intra-block 
trade. 
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6 See “Data” for more details. 
In this context, our contribution to the literature is threefold: first, we provide updated 
estimates of the effect of TAs involving at least one Latin America country on intra-block 
trade flows, not only incorporating the much less studied developments of the last twenty 
years (i.e. including in the analysis the proliferation of bilateral TAs) but also using state-
of-the-art gravity techniques (Yotov et al., 2016; Baier et al., 2019), which allows to deal 
with MTRs and endogeneity. Second, we exploit some of the novel features of the 
methodology (i.e. the use of domestic trade flows) to disentangle the effects on trade at 
the single TA level. We use total trade flows, instead of manufacturing, due to the 
importance of agriculture, mining and oil in Latin American trade.6 Third, we provide 
general equilibrium effects on trade (creation and diversion) and welfare of Latin 
American countries under different scenarios of deeper integration (see Section 5 for 
details). 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Empirical strategy  
Our empirical strategy follows Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Head and Mayer 
(2014) and Yotov et al. (2016): we implement a structural gravity model that explains 
bilateral trade flows (exports) by transaction costs and economic size, while controlling 
for multilateral trade resistances (MTRs) and endogeneity issues. 
We follow the standard procedure in the literature using the methodology proposed by 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), i.e. a pseudo-poisson maximum likelihood estimating 
procedure, which allows to properly deal with zero trade values. Additionally, following 
Yotov (2012), Dai et al. (2014) and Larch et al. (2018), we explicitly consider intra-
national trade flows ( ௜ܺ௝௧, ׊ i=j)  to account for possible additional trade creation effects 
(deriving from the choice of selling internationally rather than domestically). Therefore, 
our main specification can be written as follows: 
௜ܺ௝௧ ൌ ൫ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅ ߜ௜௧ ൅ ߛ௝௧ ൅ ߱௜௝൯ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧     (1) 
where ௜ܺ௝௧  are exports of country i to country j at time t. Country i (or j) is either a Latin 
American country, a OECD country, or a BRICS country.7 In this way, we account for 
approximately the 85% of Latin American countries total trade. ܶܣ௜௝௧ is a dummy 
7 BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
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We combine all agreements among non-Latin American countries into the variable 
ܶܣ௜௝௧ோ௢ௐିோ௢ௐ, where iǡ ݆ ב Latin America, with the exception of the European Union (EU) 
whose effect we estimate separately. We set ܶܣ௜௝௧ோ௢ௐିோ௢ௐ equal to zero when the EU 
௜ܺ௝௧ ൌ  ቀߚ଴ ൅ ߚͳܶܣ݆݅ݐ
ܮܣെܮܣ ൅ ߚʹܶܣ݆݅ݐ
ܮܣെܴ݋ܹ ൅ ߚ͵ܶܣ݆݅ݐ
ܴ݋ܹെܴ݋ܹ ൅ ߜ௜௧ ൅ ߛ௝௧ ൅ ߱௜௝ቁ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧     (2) 
variable. It is equal to one when the dyad ij has a trade agreement in force at time t, and 
zero otherwise. In the spirit of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), ߜ௜௧ and ߛ௝௧ account for 
MTRs and all the other country-time varying characteristics (e.g. GDP), ߱௜௝ are dyad 
fixed effects, and represent Baier and Bergstrand (2007) solution to endogeneity issues 
related to trade policy variables. Therefore standard gravity variables varying by country-
pair are automatically excluded from the regression and cannot be estimated (distance, 
contiguity, common language, colonial relationship, etc.). 
In equation (2), we further disentangle the average “TA effect” into different “averages” 
for three types of TA: among Latin American countries; between Latin American 
countries and non-Latin American countries; and among non-Latin American countries 
(the “rest of the world”). 
ܶܣ௜௝௧௅஺ି௅஺ is equal to 1 if exporter i is in a TA with importer j at time t, where i,j are Latin 
American countries and 0 otherwise.  ܶܣ௜௝௧௅஺ିோ௢ௐ is equal to 1 if exporter i is in an 
agreement with importer j at time t, where either i or j (but not both at the same time) are 
Latin American countries and 0 otherwise. ܶܣ௜௝௧ோ௢ௐିோ௢ௐ is equal to 1 if exporter i is in an 
agreement with importer j at time t, where i,j are not Latin American countries and 0 
otherwise. 
Finally, we move beyond the dichotomy indicated by Kohl (2014) – the apparent scarcity 
of studies that combine advanced econometrics with ad-hoc agreement analysis (Kohl 
itself, Baier et al., 2018, Baier et al., 2019, and Freeman and Pienknagura, 2019, are 
relevant exceptions) – by estimating the effect of each of the TA (involving at least one 
Latin American country) included in our database separately in equation (3), where K is 
the number of agreements involving at least one Latin American country.  
(3) ௜ܺ௝௧ ൌ  ቀߚ଴ ൅ σ ߚଵ௞ܶܣ௜௝௧௞௄௞ୀଵ ൅ ߚʹܧܷ ൅ ߚ͵ܶܣ݆݅ݐ
ܴ݋ܹെܴ݋ܹ ൅ ߜ௜௧ ൅ ߛ௝௧ ൅ ߱௜௝ቁ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧                  
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8 An alternative approach would have been to keep ܶܣ௜௝௧ோ௢ௐିோ௢ௐ equal to one when the EU dummy is equal to one. In 
that case, ߚଶ would have represented the deviation of the “EU effect” from the average ܶܣ௜௝௧ோ௢ௐିோ௢ௐ effect. 
9 The WTF is based on the UN COMTRADE database, cleaned of those observations where importer and exporter 
declarations differ by implausibly large amounts (i.e. the ratio between the two is either <0.1 or >10). 
Export data are from the World Trade Flows (WTF) database (Feenstra and Romalis, 
2014).9 Importantly, the WTF database reports total bilateral trade between country pairs. 
Therefore, it includes not only manufacturing but also mining and agricultural goods, 
which represent an essential share of Latin American exports. Intra-national trade flows 
are not readily available. To maximize the number of Latin American countries in our 
database, we follow Yotov (2012) and calculate intra-national flows ( ௜ܺ௝௧, ׊ i=j) as the 
difference between GDP (available from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database) and total national exports (from IMF DOTS). 10 Trade agreements information 
has been retrieved from the World Bank Horizontal Depth Database (Hofmann et al., 
2017; Hofmann et al., 2019), which contains detailed information on the trade agreements 
in force. The period of analysis is 1984-2015. The sample includes 53 exporters and the 
same number of importers (a complete list is reported in the Appendix). 
10 While we are aware of a set of alternative approaches to calculate intra-national flows, such as 1) assembling 
information on provincial/regional trade from a wide range of statistical sources (e.g. agricultural and industrial 
production, transportation of goods, industrial production, interregional and international trade; for the Spanish case, 
see the C-intereg Project – http://www.c-intereg.es/index.asp), 2) using information contained in input-output tables 
(see Larch et al., 2018) or 3) exploiting data on gross output and exports (Chen, 2004; de Sousa et al., 2012; Dai et al., 
2014; Borchert and Yotov, 2017), using them would substantially reduce the number of Latin American countries 
included in our database, as well as the time span of the analysis. However, due to the set of fixed effects we include 
in the regressions (i.e. importer-time, exporter-time and pair fixed effects) what matters is not the level of intra-national 
trade relative to international trade (as far as this is positive, and this is the case in our database) but the relative change. 
Therefore, this also reduces the concern of subtracting gross data (exports) from value added data (GDP). Finally, we 
are additionally reassured by the fact that our overall results are in line with Baier et al. (2019), who use gross output 
instead of value added to estimate intra-national flows. Moreover, for those agreements that are comparable (Baier et 
al., 2019, use manufacturing trade only for the period 1986-2006 and we use total trade for 1984-2015, therefore 
comparable agreements are those with bilateral trade mainly in manufacturing goods), NAFTA and Mercosur being 
the main example, results are also similar in both sign and size. 
dummy is equal to one (i.e. when both exporter and importer are member states of the 
EU), so the coefficient ߚଶ represents the level of bilateral trade increase due to the EU, 
and it is directly comparable to the other coefficients (ߚଵ௞).8 
3.2. Data  
In consonance with our empirical strategy, we first proceed to present the estimates of the 
“average” TA effect on trade. These results, derived from our structural gravity model, 
are displayed in Table 1. 
4. Results and discussion 
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11 We also estimate the models with directional pair fixed effects (instead of symmetric pair fixed effects). This change 
only affects the coefficient of TA RoW-RoW in the regression excluding intra-national flows: the coefficient turns 
(positive) significant (from non-significant, see Column 2).  
Overall, in accordance with the literature (both in terms of sign and size), trade 
agreements included in our sample have a positive and significant average effect on 
bilateral trade among members: in this specification trade agreements lead to 
approximately a 10% (i.e. 100*[݁ఉ೅ಲ െ ͳሿሻ increase in trade (see Column 1). When we 
separate trade agreements by “geography” (Latin America – Latin America; Latin 
America – rest of the world; rest of the world – rest of the world), results do not change: 
the effects of a TA on bilateral trade flows are positive independently of the “geography” 
of the agreement (with the exception of TA RoW-RoW).11 The point estimate is larger 
for agreements among Latin American countries, however the coefficients are not 
statistically different among them. The sign and significance of the result do not change 
Table 1: Structural gravity – “average” and by “geography” TA effect 
Agreement “Average” w/o 
intra-national 
flows 
(1) 
By “geography” 
w/o intra-
national flows 
 (2) 
“Average” with 
intra-national 
flows 
(3) 
By “geography” 
with intra-
national flows 
(4) 
TA 0.1031***  0.4745***   
  (0.0374)  (0.0619)   
TA (LA-LA)   0.3016**   0.5509*** 
    (0.1226)   (0.1115) 
TA (LA-RoW)   0.1905***   0.5695*** 
    (0.0508)   (0.0705) 
TA (RoW-RoW)   0.0699   0.4413*** 
  (0.0448)  (0.0705) 
        
Observations 82,552 82,552 88,122 88,122 
Intra-national 
flows NO NO YES YES 
Dyad FEs YES YES YES YES 
Exp.-time & 
imp.time FEs YES YES YES YES 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Bilateral exports. Fixed effects and constants not reported for the sake 
of simplicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the importer-time, exporter-time and dyad level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
when we include our estimations of intra-national flows in the regression (see Column 3 
and 4), albeit in this case the point estimates of the coefficients are larger: when 
accounting for intra-national trade flows, trade agreements generated, on average, a 60% 
increase in trade (Column 3). The higher coefficient is in line with the literature, as in this 
way we are taking into account also trade creation effects from “domestic sales” (i.e. 
intra-national flows) to international flows, i.e. the part of domestic production that, as a 
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These estimations are robust to a series of alternative specifications (see Table 2 for 
“average” results, and Table 3 for results by “type”). Following Larch et al. (2018), a) we 
use every other year time intervals instead of consecutive years, as trade policy effects 
may take more than one year to fully materialize (Column 1 of Table 2 and 3); b) we 
allow for the existence of time-varying distance effects (i.e. the “distance effect” is 
smaller over time, in line with the literature, see Anderson and Yotov, 2010; Borchert and 
Yotov, 2017) (Column 2 of Table 2 and 3) and, in a similar fashion, c) we include the 
interaction of the dummy for international border (=1 when i≠j) with the time dummies, 
to account for the “globalization effect” (i.e. international trade costs are decreasing over 
time) (Column 3 of Table 2 and 3). Column 4 and Column 5 (both Table 2 and 3) provide 
additional robustness tests for strict(er) exogeneity of trade agreements. In Column 4 we 
include a pair time trend. In this way we are able to control for the existence of a 
monotonic trend that may bias the TA coefficient. The inclusion of bilateral trends 
reduces the point estimates. In the case of intra-Latin American agreements, the 
coefficient is only marginally significant (very close to 10% level). As argued in Larch et 
al. (2018), a non-significance of the coefficient points to possible “endogeneity issues due 
to time-varying bilateral unobserved heterogeneity, or be driven by a lack of identifying 
variation” (p.233). However, the results in Column 5 mitigate the doubts concerning the 
existence of endogeneity. Indeed, in Column 5, following Piermartini and Yotov (2016) 
and Kohl et al. (2016), we perform another test of strict exogeneity, including the lead of 
the trade agreement dummy. In the absence of reverse causality, the lead should not be 
statistically different from zero. As indicated in Piermartini and Yotov (2016) and to 
avoid capturing anticipation effects, we test the last hypothesis using four-year intervals. 
Results confirm the variables to be strictly exogenous as all the leads (aggregate, intra-
Latin America, Latin America – rest of the world, rest of the world – rest of the world) 
consequence of an international trade agreement is sold internationally rather than 
nationally (see Dai et al., 2014; and Baier et al., 2019).  
are not significant and economically irrelevant, whereas the contemporaneous trade 
agreements variables are all positive and significant.12  
                                                          
12 We also perform other robustness tests using two-year and one-year intervals. Most results hold. The only exception 
is for the TA (LA-LA) lead, which becomes significant. This result may be driven by either by anticipation effects 
(trade increases before the agreement becomes active as exporters and importers are internalizing its future effects 
when entering into force) or possible endogeneity. The latter prospect is somewhat mitigated by i) the battery of fixed 
effects included in our main regression; ii) the result of previous endogeneity tests (Table 3, Column 4 and Column 5); 
and the fact that only (approximately) 15 percent of Latin American exports were directed to another Latin American 
country at the beginning of our sample.  
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Agreement (1) 
Two-year 
intervals 
(2) 
Distance 
trend 
(3) 
Globalization 
trend 
(4) 
Pair 
trend 
(5) 
Leads 
TA (LA-LA) 0.6158*** 0.4310*** 0.4281*** 0.2704* 0.5088*** 
  (0.1314) (0.1189) (0.1191) (0.1625) (0.1610) 
TA (LA-RoW) 0.4616*** 0.3587*** 0.3101*** 0.2116*** 0.6629*** 
  (0.0796) (0.1282) (0.0789) (0.0811) (0.0951) 
TA (RoW-RoW) 0.5840*** 0.2901*** 0.1901** 0.1921** 0.4769*** 
 (0.0860) (0.0677) (0.0767) (0.0843) (0.0955) 
TA (LA-LA) (t+1)     0.0676 
      (0.0755) 
TA (LA-RoW) (t+1)     -0.0805 
      (0.0742) 
TA (RoW-RoW) (t+1)     -0.0833 
     (0.0801) 
     
 
Observations 44,010 88,122 88,122 88,122 21,850 
Dyad FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Exp.-time & imp.time 
FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Two year inter. YES NO NO NO YES (4 years) 
Distance trend NO YES NO NO NO 
Glob. trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Pair trend NO NO NO YES NO 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Bilateral exports. Fixed effects and constants not reported for the sake 
of simplicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the importer-time, exporter-time and dyad level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Agreement (1) 
Two-year 
intervals 
(2) 
Distance 
trend 
(3) 
Globalization 
trend 
(4) 
Pair 
trend 
(5) 
Leads 
TA 0.4946*** 0.3088*** 0.2238*** 0.1986*** 0.5218*** 
  (0.0668) (0.0629) (0.0655) (0.0653) (0.0821) 
TA (t+1)     -0.0801 
     (0.0650) 
      
Observations 44,010 88,122 88,122 88,122 21,850 
Dyad FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Exp.-time & 
imp.time FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
Two year inter. YES NO NO NO YES (4 years) 
Distance trend NO YES NO NO NO 
Glob. trend NO NO YES NO NO 
Pair trend NO NO NO YES NO 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Bilateral exports. Fixed effects and constants not reported for the sake 
of simplicity. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the importer-time, exporter-time and dyad level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Source: Authors’ elaboration  
Table 2: “Average” TA effect – Robustness tests 
 
Table 3: TA effect by geography” – Robustness tests 
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13 Robustness tests in line with Table 2 and 3 have been performed, but not reported for the sake of simplicity. There 
are no drastic changes in the results. 
14 These numbers are calculated assigning the “positive”, “neutral” and “negative” effect on trade depending on the 
sign and significance of the coefficient.  
15 When we exclude intra-national trade flows, we find that only a third of the trade agreements in the sample has 
positive effects on trade (20 out of 59, 34%), whereas almost two thirds have no significant effect (37 out of 59, 63%). 
As in the case of including intra-national trade flows, only two trade agreements are found to have negative effects (3% 
of the sample).. 
Table 4 contains agreement level estimates (see equation 3) of the standard structural 
gravity model.13 Results show that we disentangled agreement level estimates for a total 
of 59 TAs (plus the EU and the aggregate estimate of the “rest of TAs” in the sample) 
including at least one Latin American country (plus we estimate the EU effect separately). 
Out of these 59 TAs, 38 (64% of the agreements in our sample) have trade-enhancing 
effects, whereas 19 (32%) of them have no significant effect on trade. The remaining 2 
(3%) have negative effect on trade. 14 The estimates presented in our study are close to 
those in Baier et al. (2019), counting a trade promoting effect for more than a half (53%) 
of the agreements. On the other side, Kohl (2014) finds that only approximately a quarter 
(27%) of the agreements included in his sample have a positive effect on trade. The 
difference with the latter study may depend on the methodology and data used, as Kohl 
(2014) does not use poisson estimations nor intra-national flows.15 
Interestingly enough, many of our estimates are similar to those obtained by previous 
studies. Indeed, those that are comparable are very close in size and sign with the 
coefficient provided by Head and Mayer (2014) in their meta-analysis. In particular, we 
find the NAFTA, the Mercosur, and the Andean Community effects to be positive and 
economically significant in size. The insignificant effect of the EC-CARIFORUM 
agreement may depend on the limited number of Caribbean countries included in the 
sample (due to data availability constraints). The majority of EU agreements with 
countries in the region seem to have positive effects on bilateral trade. Additionally, we 
singled out the “EU effect”, confirming the positive effect of EU integration for trade 
among its member states. Moreover, we also present a set of estimates for agreements 
that have not previously been studied (e.g. EU – Colombia and Peru; Colombia – 
Northern Triangle, i.e El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras; Costa Rica – Peru; Japan – 
Peru; etc.). 
As next step, inspired by Baier et al. (2019) that showed important variation of trade 
effects across country-pairs within the same TA, we further dissect the TA trade effects. 
We estimate directional pair specific estimates for those TA among Latin American 
countries only (TA LA-LA) and those TA between Latin American countries and non-
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Agreement  Agreement  Agreement  
CAFTA-DR 0.2320*** Chile-Korea (Republic of) 0.7792*** MERCOSUR 0.8570*** 
 (0.0612)  (0.0882)  (0.2676) 
CAN 0.5497*** China-Costa Rica 0.3811* Mexico-Central America 0.3322*** 
 (0.1762)  (0.2035)  (0.1277) 
Canada-Chile 0.6216*** China-Peru 0.6356*** Mexico-Uruguay 0.5841*** 
 (0.0678)  (0.1712)  (0.0718) 
Canada-Colombia -0.0608 Colombia-Mexico 1.3563*** NAFTA 0.4716*** 
 (0.0950)  (0.1141)  (0.1556) 
Canada-Costa Rica 0.1274 
Colombia-Northern 
Triangle 0.5208*** Panama-Chile 0.3872 
 (0.0827)  (0.1542)  (0.2485) 
Canada-Honduras 0.3269 Costa Rica-Peru -0.1363 Panama-Costa Rica 0.0908 
 (0.2201)  (0.1774)  (0.2554) 
Canada-Panama -0.4147** 
Dominican Republic - 
Central America 1.1191*** Panama-El Salvador 0.2314 
 (0.1726)  (0.1268)  (0.1675) 
Canada-Peru 0.9001*** EC-CARIFORUM -0.2056 Panama-Guatemala 0.2157 
 (0.1694)  (0.1453)  (0.2211) 
CARICOM -0.0021 EC-Chile 0.2934** Panama-Honduras -0.1844 
 (0.2613)  (0.1309)  (0.3659) 
CACM 0.0403 EC-Mexico 0.6397*** Panama-Nicaragua -0.0689 
 (0.1450)  (0.1345)  (0.3914) 
Chile-Colombia 0.3182** EU-Central America -0.0983 Panama-Peru 0.2297 
 (0.1556)  (0.1296)  (0.1804) 
Chile-Costa Rica 0.6361*** EU-Colombia and Peru 0.2673*** Peru-Chile 0.2156* 
 (0.1644)  (0.0834)  (0.1275) 
Chile-El Salvador 1.0988*** EFTA-Central America -0.3458* Peru-Korea (Republic of) 0.7701*** 
 (0.1263)  (0.2019)  (0.1349) 
Chile-Guatemala -0.0293 EFTA-Chile 0.3841** Peru-Mexico 0.5898*** 
 (0.1601)  (0.1845)  (0.2254) 
Chile-Honduras 0.1190 EFTA-Colombia 0.0261 TPSEP -0.0458 
 (0.1503)  (0.1491)  (0.1027) 
Chile-Mexico 0.6887*** EFTA-Mexico 0.3889*** US-Colombia 0.3019*** 
 (0.1229)  (0.0869)  (0.0557) 
Chile-Nicaragua 0.4550*** EFTA-Peru 0.6263*** US-Panama 0.4352*** 
 (0.1554)  (0.2259)  (0.1428) 
Chile-Australia 0.7538*** 
El Salvador - Honduras - 
Ch. Taip. 0.6267*** US-Chile 0.4391*** 
 (0.1488)  (0.2056)  (0.1238) 
Chile-China 1.1424*** Japan-Peru 0.3165** US-Peru 0.3558*** 
 (0.1381)  (0.1600)  (0.1201) 
Chile-Japan 0.4343*** Japan-Mexico 0.5567*** EU 0.4348*** 
 (0.1415)  (0.0942)  (0.0818) 
    Other TAs 0.5310*** 
     (0.0956) 
Observations 88,122 
Dyad FEs YES 
Exporter-time and importer-time FEs YES 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Bilateral exports. Constant not reported for the sake of simplicity. 
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the importer-time, exporter-time and dyad level. 
Table 4: Structural gravity – Agreement level estimates 
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Latin American countries (TA LA-RoW) included in our sample. This means that we 
obtain 635 directional estimates. Showing in a table all the estimates collected will not be 
very practical, therefore we decide to recapitulate the information in two ways: first, we 
depict all the coefficients with their respective confidence intervals, ordered from the 
lowest to the highest (see Figure 2). Second, we delve into two case studies of important 
regional agreements, one including Latin American countries only, the Mercosur (see 
Table 5), and another involving both Latin American and non-Latin American countries, 
the NAFTA (see Table 5). 
 
Note: Distribution of direction-specific pair TA effects, 95% confidence intervals. 
-6
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Figure 2: Structural gravity – directional pair level estimates 
Mercosur Pairs βMi-Mj s.e. Mercosur Pairs βMi-Mj s.e. 
ArgentinaÆBrazil 1.0237*** 0.1852 ParaguayÆArgentina 1.2802*** 0.2268 
ArgentinaÆParaguay 0.7915*** 0.1918 ParaguayÆBrazil 0.4295* 0.2299 
ArgentinaÆUruguay 0.3778* 0.1952 ParaguayÆUruguay 1.7474*** 0.2408 
BrazilÆArgentina 1.4168*** 0.1588 UruguayÆArgentina 0.4715** 0.2221 
BrazilÆParaguay -0.0166 0.2013 UruguayÆBrazil -0.1695 0.2392 
BrazilÆUruguay -0.2505 0.1873 UruguayÆParaguay 1.1016*** 0.2302 
NAFTA Pairs βMi-Mj s.e. NAFTA Pairs βMi-Mj s.e. 
CanadaÆMexico 1.2445*** 0.2082 MexicoÆUS 1.2252*** 0.2176 
CanadaÆUS 0.3665*** 0.1140 USÆ Canada 0.2020* 0.1101 
MexicoÆCanada 1.4616*** 0.2288 USÆMexico 0.4683** 0.2061 
Note: Poisson regressions. Dependent variable: Bilateral exports. The table includes examples of directional pair 
estimates of partial equilibrium effects for Mercosur and NAFTA. Standard errors are clustered at the importer-time, 
exporter-time and dyad level. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Table 5: Structural gravity – directional pair estimates – Mercosur and NAFTA 
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17 While these models do not include some features that may influence both the dimension of trade flows and the gains 
from trade (e.g. intra-industry trade, global value chains, etc, see Ignatenko et al., 2019; Kummritz et al., 2018), they 
show other interesting features such as tractability and very high explanatory power. 
the in-depth description of the system of equations underlying the BYZ model is 
explained in detail in Baier et al. (2019) and Yotov et al. (2016). 
The BYZ model begins with a standard structural gravity model à la Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003): it relates (the value of) country of origin (country i) exports to the 
 
5. General equilibrium theory, scenarios and results 
In this section we compute the general equilibrium effects of deeper trade integration in 
Latin America. To guide our empirical analysis, we use the Baier, Yotov, and Zylkin 
(2019) structural gravity general equilibrium model (henceforth BYZ). The BYZ model 
is a one sector Armington-Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) trade model, with 
labor as the only factor of production. This is a standard and widely accepted approach in 
the literature.17 Here we provide an overview on the main mechanisms behind the model: 
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the directional pair specific TA effects. While all the 
limitations described in Baier et al. (2019) also hold in our case,16 we are able to show 
the great degree of heterogeneity present in our estimates. The number of positive and 
significant directional pair estimates is slightly above the reference study cited above, and 
corresponds to 40%. 
As previously mentioned, Table 5 is an alternative way to show the same point. There is 
a great degree of heterogeneity within TAs. It is interesting to see that our directional pair 
estimates of the case studies presented are largely in line with our expectations: in the 
case of Mercosur, they point out that the agreement generated large increases in trade 
between Argentina and Brazil (in both directions). Mercosur also had large effects on 
trade between its two smaller members, Uruguay and Paraguay (in both directions). Trade 
between large and small members saw a more moderate increase, if any. In the case of 
NAFTA, our estimates confirm that all members benefited from the agreement, in terms 
of increases in exports to the other NAFTA members. Mexican exports to US and Canada, 
as well as Canadian exports to Mexico report the largest increases with respect to situation 
previous to the entry into force of the agreement. However, US exports to Mexico and 
Canada, as well as Canadian exports to US also experienced a large expansion during the 
same period.  
                                                          
16 Baier et al. (2019) recognize that the more granular the estimate obtained, the wider the confidence bands of the 
coefficient, the higher the likelihood of incurring in an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2009
                                                          
18 This means that a part of each good sent from country i to country j “melts away” during the process, as it would 
happen to an iceberg traded between two countries. This is a standard assumption in the trade literature: see Samuelson 
(1954), Krugman (1980), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), and Jacks et al. (2010). 
19 In this way we follow the standard approach in the literature to compute partial and general equilibrium effects. 
20 As Krugman exemplified (1995), if two European countries will be transplanted in the moon (rather than being in 
the middle of Europe) they will trade more among themselves, as there will be no other close substitute for sourcing 
imports or as an export destination.  
destination country (country j) expenditure. The strength of this relationship (or, in other 
words, the proportion of j’s expenditure devoted to buy i’s good) depends on three factors: 
the technology of production and wages (both exporter specific), and iceberg-type 
bilateral trade costs.18 Their role in shaping i’s exports depends on the exporter 
competition in the importer’s market. The model combines a supply side characterized 
by the production of goods differentiated by country of origin, i.e. each country of origin 
“i” produces a different variety of a certain good, with a demand side based on CES 
preferences, i.e. consumers have a “love of variety” preference structure (consumers 
value to have different goods in their consumption basket). The goods are (imperfectly) 
substitutable. The degree of ease in substituting goods from different origin depends on 
the elasticity of substitution, which shapes the effect of both wages and trade costs. 
Finally, the model allows for the existence of trade imbalances, which are computed in 
an additive manner, levelling out any differences between national expenditure and 
national income.  
The estimation procedure has two steps. In the first step, we compute the average partial 
effect of each TA using equation (3),19 i.e. a structural gravity model. In the second step, 
we “shock” the model by reducing bilateral trade costs for certain country-pairs 
(depending on the scenario), say i and j. In the model, a change in bilateral trade costs not 
only affects bilateral trade of i and j, but also their multilateral trade resistances. We recall 
that multilateral resistances are included to account for the fact that the existence of other 
countries (other than i and j) influences trade between i and j.20 In this way, country i and 
j will experience a decrease in their outward multilateral resistances, and the others 
(country k, k=1,...,n with k ≠i,j) a second-order increase (i.e. it depends on the choice of 
i and j to reduce bilateral trade costs). The model assumes that these effects translate into 
factory-gate prices as producers face a new international environment (more favorable 
for those countries that reduced bilateral trade costs). In turn, changes in factory-gate 
prices will have an effect on output values and expenditures. The model also allows for 
feedback effects from changes in the value of output/expenditure to trade, both directly 
(countries with higher output value trade more) and indirectly (through the multilateral 
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We use the most recent year in our database, 2015, as the reference year for the 
calculations. As in Baier et al. (2019), and following Bernard et al. (2007) and 
Simonovska and Waugh (2014), we assume a trade elasticity θ = 4. 
By construction, as in the first three of our scenarios we assume an increase in the 
efficiency of a subset of the existing TAs, we expect larger gains for those countries with 
high trade shares happening under TAs already in place. In the fourth and fifth scenarios 
we model the entry into force of a Latin American-wide TA, under different assumptions 
(average TA effect and “best intra-Latin American performer” TA effect). 
In table 6 we report the general equilibrium results under the five scenarios discussed 
above. The effects must be interpreted as long-term effects, i.e. the changes have reached 
a) In “Scenario 1”, we model an increase in the “efficiency” of intra-Latin American 
TAs. In other words, we decrease bilateral trade costs for all intra-Latin American 
TAs dyads to those of the “best performer”, i.e. the intra-Latin American TA that 
increased bilateral trade the most (Colombia – Mexico, βCOL-MEX≈1.36); 
b) In “Scenario 2”, we model an increase in the “efficiency” of agreements between 
Latin American countries and the rest of the world. In other words, we decrease 
bilateral trade costs for all dyads of those TAs that involve both Latin American 
and rest of the world countries to those of the “best performer”, i.e. the Latin-
American-rest of the world TA that increased bilateral trade the most (Chile – 
China, βCHL-CHN≈1.14); 
c) In “Scenario 3”, we combine the “efficiency” gains modeled in the two previous 
scenarios 
d) In “Scenario 4”, we model the entry into force of a regional trade agreement 
(RTA) among all Latin American countries, with an effect on trade equal to the 
“best performer” among intra-Latin American TAs (Colombia – Mexico, as 
above); 
e) In “Scenario 5”, we lower the expected effect of such RTA to the average effect 
of the existing TAs among Latin American countries. 
resistances, as countries with higher output, or in gravity terminology countries that are 
“larger”, have more influence on third-country trade). 
Therefore, using the coefficient estimated in equation (3), we construct five different 
scenarios where we assume a reduction in bilateral trade costs for a varying set of Latin 
American countries: 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration  
Country ∆%Trade ∆%Welfare ∆%Trade ∆%Welfare ∆%Trade ∆%Welfare ∆%Trade ∆%Welfare ∆%Trade ∆%Welfare
ARG 64.73 1.64 -1.89 -0.03 45.18 1.15 92.57 2.30 25.41 0.61
BOL 22.89 2.17 -2.61 -0.25 13.00 1.17 105.64 12.26 32.32 3.20
BRA 23.95 0.62 -1.97 -0.05 15.54 0.41 48.41 1.26 13.24 0.34
CHL 16.34 1.44 113.99 11.94 120.58 12.83 42.92 4.05 12.05 1.07
COL 31.01 1.50 92.63 4.57 109.31 5.50 54.16 2.58 15.18 0.69
CRI 45.57 3.74 103.26 9.33 124.60 11.72 50.76 4.33 14.85 1.18
DOM 4.99 0.44 20.04 1.22 23.12 1.48 32.24 2.50 9.50 0.71
ECU 23.93 1.64 -2.79 -0.15 13.39 0.93 52.73 3.68 14.95 0.98
GTM 64.21 4.76 72.54 5.40 107.64 8.37 66.74 5.10 19.94 1.41
GUY 7.36 0.89 22.84 3.60 27.01 4.19 24.81 4.87 7.46 1.32
HND 43.83 7.34 83.86 13.42 101.88 18.14 44.32 7.57 13.54 2.08
HTI 0.55 0.14 -1.16 0.00 -0.90 0.07 35.39 6.30 10.01 1.83
JAM 1.97 0.21 22.04 1.29 23.36 1.41 19.24 3.18 5.34 0.92
MEX 5.01 0.57 105.48 17.03 107.33 17.39 9.34 1.09 2.58 0.29
NIC 50.94 12.25 58.16 10.18 82.08 18.27 56.26 13.84 18.46 3.82
PAN 20.94 1.59 27.83 4.05 41.45 5.10 56.04 5.38 17.04 1.43
PER 35.57 2.16 121.52 7.78 138.79 9.17 48.94 3.05 13.67 0.81
PRY 84.03 7.90 -1.79 -0.09 61.22 5.60 104.15 9.77 31.06 2.56
SLV 64.80 8.46 61.99 8.11 95.57 13.36 66.47 9.08 20.81 2.51
URY 69.22 4.46 -1.81 -0.05 47.96 3.11 83.87 5.18 23.67 1.38
VEN -0.43 -0.04 -1.74 -0.15 -2.03 -0.17 33.84 3.41 10.08 0.94
AUS -0.08 0.00 -0.48 -0.01 -0.52 -0.01 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.00
AUT -0.05 0.00 0.77 0.11 0.72 0.11 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.00
BEL -0.06 -0.02 0.32 0.59 0.28 0.57 -0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
CAN -0.08 -0.01 4.40 0.49 4.31 0.48 -0.20 -0.01 -0.06 0.00
CHE -0.08 -0.01 1.54 0.28 1.46 0.27 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 0.00
CHN -0.20 -0.01 1.72 0.04 1.54 0.03 -0.43 -0.02 -0.12 0.00
CZE -0.05 -0.01 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.32 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
DEU -0.07 -0.01 1.37 0.18 1.31 0.17 -0.13 -0.01 -0.04 0.00
DNK -0.10 0.00 1.05 0.10 0.96 0.10 -0.18 -0.01 -0.05 0.00
ESP -0.17 -0.01 4.78 0.33 4.60 0.32 -0.30 -0.01 -0.09 0.00
FRA -0.08 0.00 1.39 0.10 1.31 0.10 -0.14 0.00 -0.04 0.00
GBR -0.06 0.00 0.75 0.06 0.69 0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.00
GRC -0.05 0.00 1.20 0.07 1.14 0.07 -0.14 0.01 -0.04 0.00
HUN -0.04 0.00 0.41 0.25 0.37 0.24 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
IND -0.20 0.00 -1.27 -0.01 -1.38 -0.01 -0.19 0.00 -0.05 0.00
IRL -0.04 -0.01 0.73 0.11 0.68 0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
ISL -0.09 -0.01 0.74 0.10 0.67 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
ITA -0.09 0.00 2.12 0.14 2.03 0.13 -0.19 -0.01 -0.05 0.00
JPN -0.10 0.00 4.10 0.13 4.00 0.13 -0.29 -0.01 -0.08 0.00
KOR -0.13 -0.01 0.39 0.05 0.28 0.04 -0.29 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01
LUX -0.05 0.00 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.07 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.00
NLD -0.06 -0.01 0.84 0.52 0.78 0.51 -0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01
NOR -0.07 -0.01 0.42 0.03 0.37 0.03 -0.12 -0.01 -0.03 0.00
NZL -0.10 0.00 -0.43 0.00 -0.49 0.00 -0.33 -0.01 -0.11 0.00
POL -0.05 0.00 0.45 0.10 0.41 0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.00
PRT -0.08 0.00 1.24 0.14 1.16 0.13 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.00
RUS -0.11 -0.01 -0.72 -0.05 -0.79 -0.06 -0.21 -0.01 -0.06 0.00
SVK -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.13 -0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.00
SWE -0.07 0.00 0.99 0.09 0.93 0.08 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.00
TUR -0.08 0.00 -0.30 0.02 -0.35 0.02 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.00
USA -0.42 -0.01 26.23 0.67 25.69 0.66 -0.76 -0.01 -0.22 0.00
ZAF -0.09 -0.01 -0.87 -0.06 -0.93 -0.06 -0.20 -0.01 -0.06 0.00
Latin 
American 
Countries
Rest of the 
World
Scenario 1: Decrease 
bilateral trade costs to 
best performer for 
existing intra-Latin 
American TAs
Scenario 2: Decrease 
bilateral trade costs to 
best performer for 
existing  Latin American-
RoW TAs
Scenario 3:
scenario 1 + scenario 2
Scenario 4: RTA among 
Latin American countries 
(best performer)
Scenario 5: RTA among 
Latin American countries 
(average intra-Latin 
America TA effect)
Table 6: Structural gravity – General equilibrium estimates of deeper Latin 
American integration. 
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we perform the estimations with aggregate bilateral data. This means that we do not 
account for possible heterogeneous effects across the distribution of sectors, firms and 
households (Grossman and Helpman, 2018; Artuc et al., 2019). Finally, we recall that 
trade in services, inherently different from trade in goods (see Mattoo et al., 2006), and 
the effects of its liberalization are outside the scope of this paper.  
                                                          
21 In Scenario 2 and 3 (Column 2 and 3, Table 5), the positive results obtained for non-Latin American countries are 
stemming from the fact that we lower bilateral trade costs for LA-RoW TAs, which include all those agreements among 
Latin American (LA) and non-Latin American countries (RoW). 
its maximum potential in terms of trade creation (according to the literature, trade 
agreements reach their maximum potential between 8 and 12 years after their entry into 
force, see Bergstrand et al., 2015, for more details). The predicted changes in trade and 
welfare are large and significant for a majority of countries. While gains from trade are 
more balanced in the cross-section for Latin American countries when we simulate deeper 
trade integration within Latin American (either by increasing the “efficiency” of existing 
TAs or when we simulate a new Latin American TA), there are important differences 
stemming from decreasing bilateral trade costs for all dyads of those TAs that involve 
both Latin American and rest of the world countries to those of the “best performing” TA 
(deriving from the unequal participation in TAs with the rest of the world across Latin 
American countries). Therefore, depending on the scenario, gains in trade and welfare do 
not avoid trade diversion effects to prevail for a number of countries (see Table 6, Column 
2).21 The main message underpinning all these scenarios is that further gains in trade and 
welfare are attainable for Latin American countries by the means of deeper integration. 
While our scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4 certainly reflect upper bound estimates for the majority 
of Latin American countries, they also show that we cannot rule out the hypothesis that 
uncoordinated actions might divert trade away from certain countries to others. Scenario 
5 is a comparably “more realistic” scenario, where all Latin American countries sign a 
regional trade agreement that reduces bilateral trade costs as the average TAs currently in 
force in Latin America. In other words, the “trade effect” of this TA is equal to the average 
of the existing TAs among Latin American countries. Obviously, trade and welfare 
increases are much more limited with respect to the other scenarios, but still large and 
significant (between 2.5 and 32% increase in trade, and between 0.3 and 3.8% increase 
in welfare). In this latter scenario, trade diversion effects are close to zero. 
Nevertheless, these results are subject to certain caveats: the structural gravity general 
equilibrium model we use is a one sector one factor of production model. Additionally, 
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Finally, our evidence – in support of large and positive aggregate welfare gains for Latin 
America deriving from further trade integration – does not shed light on the distribution 
of these gains across sectors, firms and households in Latin America. Indeed, a vast and 
expanding literature argues that trade integration (and globalization more broadly) may 
produce winners and losers (Williamson, 2005; Geishecker and Görg, 2008; Autor et al., 
6. Conclusions 
This study exploits econometric methods at the frontier of the empirical trade literature 
to estimate the effects of trade agreements on trade, both in terms of “average effect” and 
at the single agreement level, with particular attention to Latin America. Additionally, it 
estimates general equilibrium trade and welfare effects in different scenarios of further 
trade integration. We use a poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation strategy 
(Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) and account for intra-national trade flows, as TAs may 
affect the economic incentives of selling goods domestically rather than internationally 
(to TA’s members). 
We find that, overall, trade agreements included in our sample have a positive and 
significant (average) effect on bilateral trade among members. However, when estimating 
the effects at the single agreement level, we discover a considerable degree of 
heterogeneity in the results. Indeed, 38 (64%) of the 59 estimations performed at the TA 
level have trade-enhancing effects, whereas 19 (32%) of them have no significant effect 
on trade. The remaining 2 (3%) have negative effect on trade. 
In other words, while acknowledging a substantial degree of heterogeneity across trade 
agreements, our findings point towards a positive and economically significant effect – 
on average – of TAs on Latin American trade. Additionally, our quantification of general 
equilibrium effects on the trade volumes and welfare of Latin American countries under 
alternative scenarios of deeper integration indicates that further gains are attainable: while 
the majority of our scenarios surely portray upper end estimates of these benefits, they 
are useful benchmarks. Generally, deeper integration across Latin American countries 
does not necessarily mean improving the content and the scope of existing TAs 
individually. Possibly, a coordinated approach and the implementation of new, large, and 
encompassing regional agreements may be a more effective way to deal with the problem 
(as suggested by IADB, 2018). However, to understand the institutional design capable 
of maximizing the gains from trade for Latin American countries is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
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2013; Artuc and McLaren, 2015; Lin and Fu, 2016), and that deriving higher growth rates 
may go hand in hand with higher wage inequality (Grossman and Helpman, 2018; Artuc 
et al., 2019). Other authors argue that side effects may feed in into politics (Autor et al., 
2016; Colantone and Stanig, 2018a; Colantone and Stanig, 2018b), and studies on some 
potential policy responses are becoming available (i.a., see Claeys and Sapir, 2018, on 
the European Globalization Adjustment Fund). These issues deserve further research and 
consideration within the Latin American context.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Countries included in the database 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, Hungary, India, 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Rep. of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Russia, El 
Salvador, Slovakia, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela and South Africa 
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